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13.1  Introduction 
Youth unemployment  can be divided into two principal components. 
One  of these arises from the high turnover among young people. As Baily 
and Tobin  have written:  “Much  teenage unemployment,  it  is  often 
observed, comes from dissatisfaction with the available job options, a gap 
between expectations or aspirations and the realities of  low wages and 
poor working conditions. One consequence is high turnover. Even when 
jobs are available, therefore, unemployment is high.”’ 
The second component arises from the shortage of jobs. As Clark and 
Summers point out, “the substantial cyclic response to changes in aggre- 
gate demand suggest that a shortage of  job opportunities characterizes 
the youth labor market.”* This second component is, of  course, larger 
during recessions. The data used in this study, described in the next 
section, refer to 1975 and the  early part of 1976, when unemployment was 
still quite high. The unemployment rate for the whole civilian labor force 
was above 7% throughout this period and rates for young workers (16 to 
19 years old) were above 18%. The component representing demand 
deficiency at current wage rates, rather than turnover, must therefore 
have been substantial. 
The existence of  demand deficiency unemployment of  youths has an 
implication that we seek to test: If  there is a shortage of  jobs for young 
Albert Rees is president of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Wayne Gray is associated 
with Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research. The authors are 
indebted  to  Richard B.  Freeman  and T. Aldrich  Finegan for helpful comments and 
suggestions. The research reported here is part of  the NBER’s research program in labor 
studies. Any opinions expressed are those of  the authors and not those of  the National 
Bureau of  Economic Research. This research was  supported by  the Alfred P.  Sloan 
Foundation. 
453 454  Albert Rees and Wayne Gray 
workers at prevailing wages, then there must be one or more nonprice 
rationing mechanisms that determine which young people get the avail- 
able jobs. Our special hypothesis is that the family of  the young person 
furnishes such a mechanism: those young people get jobs whose parents 
or siblings have jobs, particularly jobs in which they can influence hiring 
decisions. Some support for this view can be found in earlier studies of the 
labor force participation  of  young people. Bowen and Finegan, who 
found that after controlling for other factors the labor force participation 
of married women falls with husbands’ incomes, were surprised to find 
that the adjusted labor force participation rate of males 14 to 17 in school 
in urban areas in 1960 rose through the range of  other family income 
between $4,000 and $11,OOO. In seeking to explain this, they wrote: “We 
suspect that part of the explanation turns on the comparative advantage 
that youngsters in these families have in finding part-time jobs. For one 
thing, their parents are more frequently able to help, mainly as a result of 
their business and social conta~ts.”~  Robert Lerman found significant 
effects of  parents’ occupations on the employment  of  youths,  using 
dummy variables for broad occupational categories. In particular, he 
found that having a parent who is a white-collar worker, either salaried or 
self-employed, or a farm manager, significantly increases the probability 
of  employment relative  to having one who is a low-level blue-collar 
~orker.~ 
It should be noted that giving assistance in finding work is clearly not 
the only way in which family members can influence the employment 
prospects of  young people. Much education takes place in the home so 
that youths who have well-educated parents and who have been exposed 
to books and to serious discussion  while growing up may have advantages 
in finding and holding jobs over other youths with the same amount of 
formal schooling. Moreover, families have expectations about how their 
members should behave. Young people whose families expect them to go 
to work for whatever reason (cultural, religious, or economic) are more 
likely to be employed than young people whose families do not have this 
expectation. We shall refer to such expectations as a work ethic. 
It follows that a variety of variables measuring different aspects of the 
family and its members might have some discernible effect on estimates 
of employment probabilities. In addition to family income, these could 
include education, occupation, and location. (The work ethic might be 
stronger in some areas than in others.) 
We set out to test the hypothesis that parental contacts assist youths in 
finding  jobs. Our results show no significant effects of parental character- 
istics on youth employment. We do, however, find significant effects of 
the employment status of siblings, which indicates the presence of some 
sort of  intrafamily interactions. 455  Family Effects in Youth Unemployment 
13.2  The Data Set 
The results presented in this paper are from the cross-sectional  data set 
called the “Survey of Income and Education” collected in the spring of 
1976 (April through July). The full sample is a national stratified prob- 
ability sample of  households in which 151,000 households were inter- 
viewed.  This makes the sample roughly three times the size of  the 
Current Population Survey. The interview includes most of the informa- 
tion available from CPS interviews, plus a good deal of additional detail 
on sources of  1975 income and on education. 
We have analyzed data for men and women aged 17 to 20 living in 
nonfarm households where they are the children of  the head. This ex- 
cludes those young people who have moved out of their parents’ house- 
hold to live by themselves or establish their own families. The group that 
was 17 to 20 in 1976 was 16 to 19 in 1975, and one of  our dependent 
variables measures work experience in 1975. Using the ages 17 to 20 in 
1976  rather than 16  to 19  also gives us a less unequal division of the sample 
between those in school and those not in school. 
The distinction made here between those in school and those not in 
school is based on whether or not the person had attended school since 
February  1976. The alternative of  using major activity in the survey 
reference week is only viable for those observations collected in April 
and May, since many June and July observations were collected during 
school vacations. 
The  regressions presented in the next section are based on a data file we 
have created that merges observations on the young person with observa- 
tions on household income and individual data on other members of the 
household 16 years of  age and older. These individual data include sex, 
age, schooling status, employment status, and relationship to the young 
person. Additional data are used on the head of  household (one of  the 
youth’s parents), including industry, occupation, and years of education. 
These, it was felt, could help to measure the likelihood of  the parent 
having contacts that would help the youth get a job. 
13.3  Regression Results 
We have been persuaded by the work of  Clark and Summers, among 
others, that for young people the distinction between being unemployed 
and being out of  the labor force is not always meaningful, since the 
boundary between these states is so blurred. Accordingly, we use several 
measures of employment as our dependent variables. The two measures 
shown here are: (1) estimated total hours worked last year (the product of 
weeks worked and usual hours per week) and (2) a dichotomous variable 
taking the value of  one if  the teenager was employed in the survey 456  Albert Rees and Wayne Gray 
reference week. We also used weeks worked last year and a dichotomous 
variable indicating unemployment in the survey reference week as depen- 
dent variables, but the results are not presented here. The regressions 
using weeks worked give similar results to those using total hours worked 
but their explanatory power is not quite as great. The regressions using 
unemployment explain very little for in-school youths. For out-of-school 
youths all significant coefficients in the employment regression have the 
opposite sign in the unemployment regression, though the explanatory 
power is again low. 
Each model was estimated separately for males and females in and out 
of school. We chose to treat the decision to attend school as given, rather 
than as jointly endogenous with the decision to work, in order to simplify 
estimation. The means for many variables differ substantially across the 
subsets, especially for the dependent variables. The differences are most 
striking between in-school and out-of-school youths, with out-of-school 
youths showing stronger ties to the labor force: over one-third more 
employment and unemployment and twice as many hours worked last 
year as in-school youths. The coefficients  obtained in the separate estima- 
tions  are also quite different for in-school and out-of-school youths, 
ruling out any attempt to capture the effects of school attendance with a 
dummy variable. The split between male and female shows less conclu- 
sive differences, although the effects of  some of  the control variables 
(notably marriage) do vary substantially between groups. 
Table 13.1 gives the means and standard deviations of all variables for 
each of  the four subsets used. Table 13.2 shows our estimates of  the 
determinants of  estimated hours worked  last year.  We  used  a tobit 
technique to allow for the presence of people who did not work in 1975 
and hence have zero hours observed. Table 13.4 shows the corresponding 
estimates of  the determinants of  employment in the reference week, 
using a probit technique  to allow for the dichotomous nature of  the 
dependent variable. Tables 13.3 and 13.5 simply involve rescaling the 
tobit  and probit coefficients to correspond  to ordinary  least-squares 
coefficients for easier interpretation. 
In general, we get significant effects (at the 5% level) for variables 
measuring schooling, race, being in a female-headed household, and 
being in a poverty  area. We  also estimate significant effects for the 
employment status of  siblings, but generally not for the employment 
status of the head. 
13.3.1  Schooling 
Since we are dealing with people whose schooling has often not been 
completed, we measure years of  school completed relative to the mean 
for all people of  the same age in the main SIE sample. The variable 
“education gap 1” measures the number of years above the overall mean Table 13.1  Characteristics of the PoDulation. Youths 17-20 
Independent variables  Means and standard deviations of  variables 
In school  Not in school 
Male  Female  Male  Female 
Education gap 1 
Education gap 2 




Male head self-employed 
Poverty area 
Older brother not employed 
Older brother employed 
Older sister not employed 
Older sister employed 
Younger brother not employed 
Younger brother employed 
Younger sister not employed 
Younger sister employed 
Dependent variables 
Employment last week 
Total hours worked last year 
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Number of  observations  9196  8385  3534  2604 Table 13.2  Determinants of Total Hours Worked Last Year, Youths 17-20 
Independent variables  Coefficients and t-ratios 
In school  Not in school 
Female  Male  Female  Male 
Education gap 1 
Education gap 2 




Male head self-employed 
Poverty area 
Older brother not employed 
Older brother employed 
Older .sister not employed 
Older sister employed 
Younger brother not employed 
Younger brother employed 
Younger sister not employed 
Younger sister employed 
Controls for: 




Number of  observations 




Mean of  deoendent variable 
-22.9 
(-2.20) 
-  127.2 
(- 11.99) 










-  111.3 
(-4.76) 
(-5.27) 
-  129.3 
35.0 
(1.88) 
















































































-  148.4 
-  5.4 
(- 0.09) 
-  197.2 
(-2.10) 
( -  4.5) 
(4.33) 
207.8 




















































(for uncensored observations)  669.0  577.7  1285.7  1186.5 459  Family Effects in Youth Unemployment 
Table 13.3 
Independent Variables  Standardized coefficients (“DYIDX”) 
Determinants of Total Hours  Worked  Last Year,  Youths 17-20 
In school  Not in school 
Male  Female  Male  Female 
Education gap 1 
Education gap 2 




Male head self-employed 
Poverty area 
Older brother not employed 
Older brother employed 
Older sister not employed 
Older sister employed 
-  17.1 
-94.9 
-  9. 





















Younger brother not employed  -40.1  -5.9 
Younger brother employed  125.7  87.1 
Younger sister employed  132.1  130.7 
Younger sister not employed  -37.2  -44.3 





-  70.7 
46.5 
-33.2 
-  177.8 
105.5 
-  127.1 
-4.6 




-  67.2 
-  101.3 
50. 
-481.1 
-  192.0 
28.9 
56.2 
-  163.8 
45.4 
-48.6 






for those who are above. “Education gap 2” measures the number of 
years below the overall mean for those below. Having less education than 
the average of  one’s age group lowers employment significantly in all 
eight regressions. 
The three negative signs on “education gap 1” in table 13.2  seem to be 
an anomaly arising because those people with more education than their 
age group had a greater than average probability of being in school in the 
preceding year. In table 13.4, where the schooling status and dependent 
variables both refer to the same year, the signs on “education gap 1” are 
all positive. 
13.3.2  Income 
A second set of variables measures family income. The one used here, 
“other family income,” is the income of the household in 1975 minus the 
earnings of the young person whose behavior is being measured. This has 
no significant effect on employment in the reference week. For those in 
school its effect on total hours worked in the preceding year is mixed, 
while it is significantly positive for those who are not in school. In earlier 
work we used a number of  additional variables indicating whether the 
household received income in 1975 from various kinds of  transfer pay- 
ments. At some stages of  our work,  a few of  these variables showed 
significant negative effects on some measures of  youth employment. 
However, they did not remain significant in the presence of  the other 
variables included in the final model. 460  Albert Rees and Wayne Gray 
Table 13.4  Determinants of EmDlovment Last Week. Youths 17-20 
Independent variables  Coefficients and t-ratios 
In school  Not in school 
Male  Female  Male  Female 
Education gap 1 
Education gap 2 




Male head self-employed 
Poverty area 
Older brother not employed 
Older brother employed 
Older sister not employed 
Older sister employed 
Younger brother not employed 
Younger brother employed 
Younger sister not employed 
Younger sister employed 
Controls: Same as in table 13.2 
Number of  observations 
Log likelihood 
Mean of  deDendent variable 
,057 
(2.52) 
-  ,128 
(-7.50) 
-  ,047 
(-0.02) 
-  .606 
(- 63.68) 
-  ,318 
(- 16.28) 




-  .244 
(- 16.22) 























-  .013 
-  .492 
(-37.19) 
-  .231 
(- 10.30) 




-  .250 
(- 16.24) 


























-  .487 
-  .022 




-  ,067 
(-2.35) 




















-  ,160 
(-7.21) 
-  ,002 
-  ,686 
(- 32.37) 
-  .210 
(- 4.83) 
-  .185 




-  ,353 



















,539  .481  .710  ,672 
13.3.3  Geographical Variables 
A third set of  variables deals with various geographic aspects of  the 
labor market. The data set places observations in one of  nine regions of 
the country. We have included a set of eight regional dummy variables in 
all regressions as control variables, and there are always some significant 
differences in youth employment by region. Variables indicating whether 
or not the household lived in an SMSA or in the central city of  an SMSA 461  Family Effects in Youth Unemployment 
Table 13.5  Determinants of EmDbovment Last Week,  Youths 17-20 
Indeuendent variables  Standardized coefficients (“DYIDX”) 
In school  Not in school 
Male  Female  Male  Female 
Education gap 1  0.023  0.008  0.016  0.121 
Education gap 2  -0.051  -0.035  -0.038  -0.058 
Other family income x  10W4  -0.019  -0.005  0.008  -0.001 
Black  -0.241  -0.196  -0.167  -0.248 
Spanish  -0.126  -0.092  -0.008  -0.076 
Female head  -  0.075  -  0.017  -0.057  -0.067 
Male head self-employed  0.002  0.006  0.053  0.091 
Poverty area  -0.096  -0.100  -0.023  -0.128 
Older brother not employed  -0.152  -0.074  -0.074  -0.065 
Older sister not employed  -0.085  -0.114  -0.068  -0.058 
Younger brother not employed  -  0.087  -  0.058  -0.075  -0.021 
Older brother employed  0.040  0.019  0.025  0.030 
Older sister employed  0.042  0.053  0.045  0.047 
Younger brother employed  0.133  0.154  0.074  0.055 
Younger sister employed  0.094  0.136  0.052  0.159 
Younger sister not employed  -0.059  -0.081  -0.011  0.001 
were not significant. The final model includes a dummy variable taking 
the value of one if the household lives in an area designated by the Census 
Bureau as a poverty area. In our sample, 12 to 13% of  youths in school 
and 17 to 18% of  youths not in school lived in such areas. This variable 
has an effect that is consistently negative and usually clearly significant. 
For youths in school of  both sexes, living in a poverty area reduces the 
probability  of  employment  by  lo%, other things equal.  Since other 
family income and race appear in the regressions, this should probably be 
interpreted  as measuring  the availability of  job opportunities in the 
locality. 
We also tried using a variable measuring the total unemployment rate 
in the SMSA for SMSAs that could be identified in the data set. The 
unemployment rate was taken from a published external source (Depart- 
ment of  Labor estimates for May 1976) and merged into the data set. 
Only about one-third of  our observations were in areas for which we 
could use this information. The variable did not have a significant effect 
even in regressions confined to observations for which the variable could 
be used. We might have gotten better results by generating unemploy- 
ment rates by area for spring 1976 from our own data set. However, this 
would have required processing data on all households; we have used 
only households including youths. 
13.3.4  Race 
We have used two variables to identify youth by race, dummy variables 
identifying blacks and Hispanics.  Both  are consistently negative and 462  Albert Rees and Wayne Gray 
usually significant with the effect of being black being generally substan- 
tially larger than that of being Hispanic. For regressions whose depen- 
dent variable is “employed last week,” being black lowers the probability 
of employment by 17 to 25% even after controlling for schooling, other 
family income, and location in a poverty area. For youths not in school, in 
table 13.2, negative coefficients on the variable identifying blacks are 
about one-half the size of the mean of the dependent variable. With other 
measured variables equal, we estimate that black youths not in school 
worked half as many hours in 1975 as white youths. We also duplicated 
our analysis with regressions run using only observations on blacks. The 
results (not reported here) tend to be similar, with less consistency of 
coefficients between subsamples and lower significance levels, probably 
because of the large reduction in sample size. 
We have tried using a variable measuring whether or not the principal 
language spoken in the household is English; this is less successful than 
the variable identifying Hispanics. 
13.3.5  Family Influences 
When we started our research, we expected to find powerful influences 
of the position of the head of the household on the employment status of 
youths living at home.  The effects we  find are much weaker than we 
expected. Living in a household with a female head has a negative effect 
in seven of  eight regressions, and a significant one in four. Living in a 
household with a self-employed male head generally has a positive effect, 
but this is significant only once at the 5% level and twice at the 10% level 
for employment and hours worked last year. The effect of unemployment 
is consistently negative and generally significant. 
Sets of  dummy variables identifying male heads who were not em- 
ployed and the major industry or occupation of the employed male heads 
performed very poorly. So did an index of three-digit occupations scaled 
by median income in the occupation in 1969. Education of the male head 
was tried and entered with a negative sign; that is, it acted as an index of 
permanent income rather than a measure of access to jobs. 
Our second set of  variables measuring family effects identifies the 
employment status of  siblings between the ages of  16 and 24 who are in 
the household, using a set of eight dummy variables. Within this large set, 
there are four subsets, for older brother, older sister, younger brother, 
and younger sister.6 In each of  these subsets, there are two dummy 
variables, e.g.,  “older brother not employed” and “older brother em- 
ployed”; the base or omitted variable of  the subset is “no older brother 
living at home.” If  the person to whom the independent variable refers 
has more than one sibling between the ages of 16 and 24 living at home, 
there may be entries of one rather than zero in more than one of these 
dummy categories. For a person with two older brothers, for example, 463  Family Effects in Youth Unemployment 
one employed and one not employed, both dummies in the older brother 
subset take the value one. 
Employment decisions within the household  are presumably made 
simultaneously, and our single equation model does not permit us to 
analyze the simultaneity. If  we have an observation on a youth named 
John who is employed and he has an older brother named Fred who is 
also employed, we detect the associations, but we cannot tell whether 
John found Fred a job, Fred found John a job, or whether both were 
subject to some common parental or environmental influence that in- 
creased the probability of  their being employed. It should also be noted 
that if  both of  them are between 17 and 20, observations for both will 
appear somewhere in our regressions with many (though not all) of the 
independent variables being identical. However, the scheme should per- 
mit us to separate the effects of job contacts and the family’s work ethic 
from income effects by  examining the signs of  the coefficients. The 
income effect of Fred’s working on the probability that John will work is 
presumably negative. 
As shown in tables 13.2 and 13.4,  the positive association of employ- 
ment status among siblings is very strong. For males in school, having an 
employed sibling significantly increases the dependent variable in seven 
of  eight cases in the two tables. Having a sibling not employed signifi- 
cantly decreases the dependent variable in all eight cases. For females 
and males not in school the effects are not always significant, though the 
signs are almost always the same. Some of  the effects for females are also 
quite large. For example, other measured variables held constant, having 
a younger brother employed increases the chances of a female in school 
being employed by 15% or increases her estimated hours worked last 
year by 87 relative to a mean of  400. 
The differences in coefficients for siblings of different sexes may sup- 
port the interpretation that the sibling variables, rather than local job 
availability or parental influence, reflect information networks in the 
labor market. Because many occupations or industries still employ work- 
ers predominantly of one sex, a youth may be better able to help a sibling 
of  the same sex find work. The differences in coefficients may also arise 
from stronger demonstration effects or closer personal relationships be- 
tween siblings of  the same sex. 
The pattern of  differences in coefficients is clearest for youths not in 
school in table 13.2. For a female, having a younger sister employed 
increases estimated hours in the preceding year by 173 hours, but the 
effect of  a younger brother employed is only 21. For a male, having a 
younger brother employed increases estimated hours in the preceding 
year by 178, but the effect of a younger sister employed is only 80. In both 
cases the larger figure is clearly significant at the 5% level and the smaller 
is not. 464  Albert Rees and Wayne Gray 
One further refinement of the sibling dummies was used: splitting each 
dummy into two  dummies for the sibling being in or out of  school. 
Besides giving an unwieldy number of  coefficients to interpret, the ex- 
panded set of dummies showed few differences in coefficients based on 
school status. Thus we chose to use only those sibling dummies presented 
here in the final model. 
As mentioned above, these results can only be viewed as suggestive 
because the family’s work ethic is not distinguishable from its job con- 
tacts. One possible area for future research would involve comparing the 
detailed occupation and industry of  each youth with those of his parents 
or siblings. A high correlation could indicate the presence of  helpful 
contacts made by  relatives on the job. Another approach could be to 
examine some other data sets to check for consistency  of the basic results 
and to add further explanatory variables, such as the presence of reading 
materials during childhood, that could capture more of  the unobserved 
part of family background. In this regard one could consult data sets that 
ask how the respondent found his job (or why he in particular was hired 
after applying). 
One final alternate approach requires a different estimation technique, 
one presented by Gary Chamberlain.’ This would use analysis of  covar- 
iance, with each set of siblings representing a different group for compar- 
ing the within-group to the between-group  variation. Some complications 
result from the differing numbers of observations across groups and the 
need to use nonlinear estimation, but it would allow one to control for 
unobserved family characteristics. 
Any of  these approaches would shed more light on what role, if  any, 
the family plays in the employment of  youths. 
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Comment  Christopher Winship 
Rees and Gray have carried out an important exploratory analysis of the 
effects of family background on youth employment behavior. Three of 
their findings are of particular note. These are: (1) that the usual mea- 
sures of  family background  have little  if  any effect on  employment 
behavior of  youths: (2) that receipt of  government transfers (welfare, 
social security, etc.) has little if  any effect on employment behavior; (3) 
that there is a large correlation between the employment behavior of 
siblings even after observed variables measuring family background and 
local labor market conditions have been controlled for. It is this last 
finding that I want to discuss in more detail. 
The strong relationship between the employment status of siblings  may 
have a number of  sources. It may be due to the effects of  unobserved 
family characteristics, local labor market conditions, or, as Rees and 
Gray suggest, the fact that siblings are able to help each other find jobs. 
An unnoticed finding in Rees and Gray’s analysis  is the distinct pattern of 
the effects. The effect of younger sibling’s employment status is almost 
always greater than that of the older sibling in real, not absolute, value 
(an observation made by Robert Mare). This relationship holds for 29 of 
the 32 possible comparisons that can be made for the regressions using 
present employment status and hours worked during the year. Thus the 
fact that a younger sibling is employed has a greater effect on a respon- 
dent’s employment  than  the fact  that  an older sibling is  employed. 
Conversely, the fact that an older sibling is not employed has a greater 
effect, in absolute value, on one’s employment (note that the effects are 
negative rather than positive in this case) than the fact that a younger 
sibling is not employed. To put it another way, knowing that a younger 
sibling is employed tells us more about the respondent’s probable em- 
ployment status than knowing that an older sibling is employed. Con- 
versely, knowing that an older sibling is not employed tells us more about 
the respondent’s employment status than knowing that a younger sibling 
is not employed. This pattern holds net of the effects of age, educational 
attainment, and other variables that we would expect to produce this 
difference. 
This pattern cannot be explained by the mechanism that Rees and 
Gray have suggested, namely, that siblings help each other find jobs. If 
we assume that this was the major explanation for the correlation be- 
tween sibling employment status, then we would expect to find either no 
pattern in the effects or that the pattern was just the opposite: an older 
sibling being employed should have a greater effect on an individual’s 
Christopher Winship is associated with the National Opinion Research Center at  the 
University of  Chicago. 466  Albert Rees and Wayne Gray 
employment status than a younger sibling. This latter conclusion follows 
from the assumption that older siblings are more likely to be able to 
provide jobs for younger ones since, presumably, they would have higher 
status jobs and thus have access to better jobs. Younger siblings would be 
likely only to have access to jobs that their older siblings would find 
undesirable. 
This finding  (that older siblings, net  of  age, education, and other 
variables, are more likely to  be employed), suggests a number of alterna- 
tive explanations. I shall discuss three briefly. First, it may be the case 
that job rationing goes on within families on an oldest-first basis. This 
would be particularly likely if  parental personal contacts were an impor- 
tant source of  jobs for youths. Second, there may be a normative struc- 
ture within households that imposes an obligation on older youths to 
obtain employment before their younger siblings do. Third, and not 
inconsistent with either of  the first two explanations, there may be a 
definite structure to intrafamilial labor supply in terms of  the age of 
different siblings. 
Having discussed Rees and Gray’s analysis briefly, I want to turn to a 
discussion of  the major hypothesis that they propose in their chapter. 
Rees and Gray propose that jobs in the youth labor market are rationed 
by means of parental personal contacts. They contend that they find no 
support in their analysis for this hypothesis, This contention is based on 
their finding that the traditional measures of  family background  and 
parental status have no effect on a youth’s employment status. 
The question I want to ask is whether this finding provides an adequate 
test of the proposed hypothesis. Let us break down the reasoning implicit 
in Rees and Gray’s argument into its three constituent parts: (1) that jobs 
are rationed in the labor market by means of personal contacts; (2) that it 
is parental contacts that are critical for youths in finding jobs; (3) that 
parents with higher socioeconomic status should have more effective 
contacts in terms of  their ability to find their children jobs. In order for 
their hypothesis to be true, statements 1  and 2 would have to be correct. 
Rees and Gray’s test, however, relies on all three statements being true. 
Clearly, there is no reason that subhypotheses 1  and 2 might hold whereas 
subhypothesis 3 might not. In fact, one could argue that parents with 
lower socioeconomic status might be in a better situation to provide their 
children with jobs since the type of jobs they have and the places where 
they are employed would be closer to the type that their children would 
have the necessary qualifications to work in. 
Table C13.1 provides more direct evidence for subhypotheses 1  and 2. 
The data are taken from the January 1973  Current Population Survey and 
its supplement. 
The table indicates that personal contacts are an important mechanism 
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Table C13.1  Method of Finding a Job by Age 
Aee 
Method  1619  20-24  over 24 
Direct  %  33.5  34.1  35.9 
application  f  399  501  821 
Relatives  %  13.3  9.4  5.4 
f  155  138  134 
Other personal  %  28.0  18.5  18.4 
contacts  f  331  273  425 
Formal and  %  25.2  38.0  40.3 
other  f  299  566  924 
NOTE:  Weighted percentages for individuals who searched for a job and found one in 1972. 
Data taken from the January 1973 CPS. Frequencies are the unweighted counts. 
particularly important for teenagers, for whom a full 41.3% of  the jobs 
found are found through personal contacts. This evidence supports the 
hypothesis that personal contacts are an important rationing mechanism, 
especially for youths. 
Second, the table indicates that jobs are found more often through 
contacts involving persons other than relatives. This is consistent with 
Granovetter’s (1974) finding that it is usually distant and weak contacts 
that are most effective in helping individuals find jobs. The table does, 
however, indicate that contacts with relatives are more important for 
youths than for adults. For youths, approximately one-third of  the jobs 
found through personal contacts are found through relatives, whereas for 
adults the number is less than a quarter. Thus we find only weak support 
for subhypothesis 2. 
I have no direct evidence on the relationship between family back- 
ground and the use of  personal contacts. Becker (1979), however, has 
done some preliminary analysis on differences by race. If  we recompute 
his figures so they are comparable to those in table C13.1, his findings 
indicate that, using the same January 1973 Current Population Survey 
data, white youths (aged 16-24)  are more likely to have found a job 
through personal contacts than black youths (33.6 versus 30.7%), but 
that of those using personal contacts blacks are more likely than whites to 
use relatives (47.5 versus 32.6%). Under the assumption that blacks in 
the survey come from families with lower socioeconomic status than 
whites, this finding is consistent with the argument made above that there 
is no necessary reason  to suspect that there is a positive relationship 
between the effectiveness of parental contacts and socioeconomic back- 
ground. 
In  summary, we  can say that we  have found evidence to support 
subhypothesis 1, weaker evidence to support subhypothesis 2, and no 
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the importance of  personal contacts has at best been suggestive. More 
work needs to be done to assess the importance of personal contacts as a 
mechanism by which people find jobs. 
The analysis by Rees and Gray is also suggestive. Perhaps their con- 
tribution lies not so much in what they have told us about the importance 
or lack of importance of personal contacts, but rather in the suggestion 
that there are potentially  rich analyses to be done on the nature of 
intrafamilial labor supply and employment behavior. This has been an 
active area with respect to husband and wives. Rees and Gray’s analysis, 
however,  suggests that  there is much to be done with regard to the 
interdependencies among siblings. In this, their chapter has suggested 
important new directions for research. 
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COm~ent  George Farkas and Ernst W. Stromsdorfer 
Economists analyzing youth employment or labor supply with microdata 
have usually been content to estimate income and substitution effects, 
with little regard for intrafamily (supply-side) tastes and decision-making 
mechanisms or  labor market (demand-side) distortions which might bias 
their results. Rees and Gray’s chapter is thus particularly valuable in that 
it explicitly introduces “family work ethic” and “family job contacts” as 
variables which might play these roles. The authors make no attempt to 
separate these supply and demand  side effects, and their test of  the 
empirical importance of the resulting combined effect is only indirect, but 
they do produce findings which suggest that something beyond the usual 
income effect is occurring in their data. 
As the authors note, the unexpected finding of a positive association 
between family income and youth labor force participation goes back at 
least  to Bowen and Finegan  (1969), who  attributed  it to a positive 
association between  family income and job contacts.  More recently, 
Gustman  and  Steinmeier  (1979)  have  replicated  this  result;  Boskin 
George Farkas and Emst W.  Stromsdorfer are economists at Abt Associates, Inc., 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 469  Family Effects in Youth Unemployment 
(1973), Hall (1973), and Ehrenberg and Marcus (1979) find little systema- 
tic effect of  family income on youth employment; and both Masters and 
Garfinkel (1977) and McDonald and Stephenson (1979) find the expected 
negative effect of income. These studies differ according to data sources, 
age of  the youth  population,  range of  family incomes for the youth 
population, empirical specification (including approaches to coping with 
the endogeneity of schooling), and statistical methodology, among other 
issues, but the wide range of  results suggests great uncertainty in our 
knowledge of  family effects on youth employment. 
Attempts to  incorporate  intrafamily taste variables into the usual 
offered-wage/asking-wage model of  labor supply (Heckman 1974) pre- 
sent fewer problems of  empirical implementation than do attempts to 
incorporate either fixed  costs of  working or demand-side distortions 
(such as minimum wages) which lead to the rationing of  jobs. In the 
former case (intrafamily tastes), measures of  taste differences can be 
taken as explicit determinants of  the youth’s reservation wage. In the 
latter case, the simple reservation wage theory is invalidated, since either 
fixed costs of working or demand deficiency at the prevailing wage cause 
youths to behave as though confronted with a nonconvex budget set. 
That is, the tobit model in which the probability of  employment and the 
hours worked by those employed are determined by a single index (the 
difference between the wage offer and the asking wage), is replaced by a 
model in which this is no longer the case. As a result (and assuming that 
net wage offers are independent of the number of hours worked), estima- 
tion with tobit can be replaced by a strategy in which a truncated normal 
distribution is fit for the hours of those employed and a separate probit is 
fit for the probability of being employed. (For further discussion of these 
and related issues see Hausman 1979; Olsen 1977; Farkas, Stromsdorfer, 
and Olsen 1979.) 
In this situation, the truncated normal for hours worked can still be 
taken to reveal the youth’s “value of time at zero hours,” and this can be 
used, in conjunction with the probit equation estimates, to identify a 
“disemployment  index”  measuring  the extent to which  employment 
probabilities inferred from the wage offer and “values of  time at zero 
hours” of  the truncated normal hours equation differ from those actually 
observed. This disemployment index subsumes both fixed costs of work- 
ing and demand deficiencies, and its significance indicates whether the 
simpler tobit specification should be rejected. More formally, we write 
(1) 
(2) 
where Wo  = the wage offer, w‘ = the value of  time at zero hours, and 
DZ = the disemployment index, each of which is taken to be a function of 
Hours = Bo (@ -  w‘)  + u;H>O 
Prob (Employment) =  Prob(@ >  w‘ + DZ) 470  Albert Rees and Wayne Gray 
exogeneous variables. If  measures of  family work ethic were introduced 
among the determinants of W*,  and measures of family job contacts were 
introduced among the determinants of DI, the effects of interest to Rees 
and Gray could be explicitly estimated. 
The authors estimate instead two sets of  reduced-form regressions, a 
tobit for hours worked and a probit for the probability of  employment. 
They include no measure of  the youth’s own wage rate, but they do 
include other family income, and (their principle innovation) measures of 
whether the youth’s siblings were employed. Their results for the effect of 
family income are as equivocal as those of  others-the  only significant 
effect is a positive one for the total hours worked by out-of-school youths. 
However, Rees and Gray’s results for the effects of siblings’ employment 
are new and quite suggestive-it  appears that, other things being equal, 
the employment of siblings is strongly and positively associated. As the 
authors note, this may be because youths’ jobs are rationed by parents’ 
contacts rather than by price; because siblings are exposed to identical 
work-ethic climates; because both effects are operative; or because some 
other family characteristic is at work. 
Further  information  on  the  determinants of  youth  employment is 
provided by estimating equations (1) and (2), above, along with a wage 
offer equation. This we have done with preprogram data collected for the 
evaluation of the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects (see Barclay 
et al., 1979, for a discussion of the program, data, and evaluation design). 
Table C13.2 presents the results for 5,462 youths aged 14-17  from low- 
income households during the summer of  1977 and residing in one of the 
eight study sites. (We focus on summer labor supply in order to avoid 
complications associated with the endogeneity of  schooling.) 
We find that the youth’s own wage exerts a powerful positive effect on 
total hours, but that other family income exerts no significant effect on 
the youth’s value of  time at zero hours. Wage offers (estimated with a 
maximum likelihood correction for possible selection bias and nonnor- 
ma1 residuals) are generally quite far in excess of estimated values of time 
at zero hours, yet only 36% of the sample is employed, suggesting that 
fixed costs of working or demand-side distortions are quite powerful. This 
situation is evidenced by the large constant term for the disemployment 
index (a finding which also demonstrates the inappropriateness of  the 
simple tobit model). The relatively large positive coefficients associated 
with the effect of a youth’s own child on his disemployment index sug- 
gests the existence of  fixed costs associated with child care, but more 
important for Rees and Gray’s concerns are the relatively insignificant 
effects of  the other variables, including other family income. It appears 
that demand deficiency is present, but that, at least for this low-income 
youth population, during the summer of  1977 (when subsidized summer 
jobs programs for low-income youths were operating at relatively high Table C13.2  Coefficient Estimates for the Wage Offer, Value of Time at Zero 
Hours, and Disemployment Index, Model of  Equations (1) and (2); 
t-statistics in Parentheses 
Dependent variable" 








Age (in months, by date of 
Young (age < 28) 
Very young (age < 17) 
Family earned income (minus 
Family welfare income (minus 
Family size 
Living with parents 
Male youth with own child 









Urban sites combined 
Mississippi combined 
birth; 1 = December 1963) 
that due to the youth)  + lo4 
that due to the youth)  -+  lo4 
,7484  (90.9) 
.oOOo  (  -) 
-  .0677  (2.19) 
-  ,0543  (1.31) 
-  ,1588  (3.66) 
-  ,0772  (2.39) 
-  .0899  (2.05) 
,0021  (1.14) 
-  ,0253  (0.77) 
-  ,0422  (1.20) 
,2497  (43.8) 
,0181  (0.77) 
-  .0234  (0.62) 
-.0089  (0.43) 
,0038  (0.09) 
.OOO8  (0.02) 
-  ,2140  (1.42) 
-.0422  (0.95) 
,0406  (1.28) 
.0979  (2.59) 
-  .0196  (0.71) 
-  .0235  (0.62) 
.oooo(  -1 
.0074  (0.23) 
.0203  (0.49) 
-  .0261  (0.67) 
.oooo( -1 
-  ,1422 (5.08) 
.4633  (19.8) 
.oOoO(  -) 
-  .0531  (1.53) 
-  ,0311  (0.65) 
-  ,0943  (1.28) 
-  ,0251  (0.43) 
-  ,0392  (0.61) 
-  .0396  (0.66) 
-.0077  (0.88) 
,0122  (0.61) 
-  .0244  (0.99) 
.OOO3  (0.33) 
,0105  (0.78) 
.2056  (1.82) 
,1055  (1.10) 
.0308  (0.43) 
-  ,0361  (0.47) 
-  .0449  (1.23) 
-  .0140  (0.35) 
-.0560  (0.84) 
,2166  (1.15) 
.0973  (1.04) 
.oooo( -1 
Bo for LnWage in hours 
equation  482.7  (5.09) 
"The wage offer equation is estimated jointly with the probit by a maximum likelihood 
technique which accounts both for possible selection and nonnormal residuals in the wage 
equation. W* is calculated from a truncated normal for hours, in which Bo,  the estimated 
coefficient for LnWage,  is used  to deflate the coefficients for the exogenous variables 
determining W*.  The standard error in the hours equation is 169.1. The coefficients for DI 
are calculated from the probit by using the coefficient for the exogenous variable identifying 
the wage offer to identify the standard error in the probit, and using this value and the 
(already calculated) estimates of  the determinants of W* to solve for the determinants of 
DI. For the LnWage equation only, the coefficients are as estimated when the right hand 
side variables are expressed as deviations from their means (source: Farkas, Stromsdorfer, 
and Olsen, 1979). 472  Albert Rees and Wayne Gray 
levels), the available jobs were rationed in close to a random manner. Of 
course, our table C13.2 estimates do not test Rees and Gray’s sibling 
employment variablesj but they do corroborate the results of those who 
have found relatively little effect of family income on youth employment. 
Youth labor markets are probably characterized by an excess of supply 
over demand  at the prevailing wage.  Accordingly, Rees and  Gray’s 
attention to nonprice mechanisms for rationing jobs represents a poten- 
tially important area for further development. We hazard a guess, how- 
ever, that personal and family characteristics other than parents’ job 
contacts are of  greatest importance for the allocation of  the available 
employment among youths from low-income households. 
References 
Barclay, S. C. Bottom, G. Farkas, E. W. Stromsdorfer, and R. J. Olsen. 
1979. Schooling and work among youths from low-income households: 
A baseline report from the entitlement demonstration. New York: Man- 
power Demonstration Research Corporation. 
Boskin, M.  1973. The economics of  labor supply. In G. Cain and H. 
Watts eds., Incomemaintenance and laborsupply.  Chicago: Markham. 
Bowen, W. G. and T. A. Finegan. 1969. The economics of  labor force 
participation. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press. 
Ehrenberg, R. G. and A. J. Marcus. 1979. A multinomial logit model of 
teenagers: School enrollment and employment outcomes. Presented at 
the December Meetings of  the Econometric Society. 
Farkas, G., E. W. Stromsdorfer, and R. J. Olsen. 1979. Youth labor 
supply during the  summer: Evidence for youths from low-income 
households. Presented at the December Meetings of the Econometric 
Society. Expanded version to appear in R. Ehrenberg ed., Research in 
labor economics (1981). 
Gustman, A. L. and T. L. Steinmeier. 1979. The impact of  the market 
and the family on youth enrollment and labor supply. Working paper 
(January). 
Hall, R. E. 1973. Wages, income, and hours of  work in the U.S. labor 
force. In Glen Cain and Harold Watts, eds., Income maintenance and 
labor supply. Chicago: Markham. 
Hausman, J. A.  1979. The effect of  wages, taxes, and fixed costs on 
women’s labor force participation. Presented at the December Meet- 
ings of the Econometric Society. To appear in Journal of Public Econo- 
mics (1980). 
Heckman, J.  1974. Shadow prices, market  wages, and labor supply. 
Econometrica 42 (July). 
Masters, S. and I. Garfinkel. 1977. Estimating the labor supply effects of 
income-maintenance alternatives. New York: Academic Press. 473  Family Effects in Youth Unemployment 
McDonald, J. F. and  S. P. Stephenson. 1979. The effect of  income 
maintenance on the school-enrollment and labor-supply decisions of 
teenagers. Journal of Human Resources 4. 
Olsen, R. J. 1977. An econometric model of  family labor supply. Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of  Chicago. This Page Intentionally Left Blank